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INFORMATIONIS PERSONAE
Much in what follows is grounded in Socratic premises: that thought develops best when it is engaged; that the give-andtake of ideas improves them; and that certainty is humbled by nuance. Our thinking has been tested time and again by the astute observations and challenges of our Informationis Personae. We gratefully acknowledge the twenty-two distinguished persons -jurists, legal scholars, philosophers, sociologists, historians, religious studies professors, political theorists, communication theorists, social activists, and even a renowned media personality -who were considerate enough to share their time and thoughts with us in our efforts to examine the parameters of dissent. Such an examination is particularly important when an ontology of a topic such as dissent is rigorously explored for the first time. Moreover, our Personae kindly permitted us to draw from our recorded interviews with them (circa 2004-2012) for use throughout the book. In the same Socratic spirit, we encourage our readers to join this dialogic process, if only to sharpen their own minds on the subject matter.
PROLOGUE
Dissent. It is a word we all know, and yet do not know.
We use the word with regularity in any variety of contexts. Judges dissent against a court majority. Political activists dissent against the establishment. Religious protesters dissent against orthodoxy. Students dissent against an administration. Newspaper editorialists dissent against politicians. Employees dissent against management. The list goes on.
In these ways and others, America values dissent, or so it seems. We often tolerate, encourage, and protect dissent. It is part of our Madisonian heritage. Some preach it, some practice it, others safeguard it, and still others endure it even when they oppose its message. Dissent is a salient feature of our modern society. It is a cultural and constitutional given.
Over the ages, dissent has been championed for assorted reasons. Dissent, it might be said, promotes self-realization and autonomy. It enables individual self-expression without fear of societal repression. The liberty of self is meaningless if one must always conform to majority will. Freedom for the outsider allows a unique brand of self-identity and selfexpression.
Dissent, it might be said, advances religious freedom. When people of faith are permitted to question prevailing beliefs, they stand to redefine the relationship between Dissent, it might also be said, contributes to the marketplace of ideas. It does this by promoting competition among divergent viewpoints. The hope is that, in the battle of opinions, some form of truth will prevail over falsehood, and the struggle will produce a more enlightened citizenry.
Dissent, it might further be said, enables self-governance by civic participation. Such participation is a two-way street: it is the prerogative to agree or disagree with governmental action. When the governed rule, they must have the right to differ from their governors. Dissent, it might be said, checks governmental abuses of power. When the whistle-blower exposes governmental corruption or malfeasance, political power then comes under public scrutiny. By raising citizen awareness, dissent might bring about institutional reforms.
Dissent might moreover cultivate a democratic culture of tolerance, where all views are suffered no matter how objectionable they may be. Democracy is diversity, and diversity of views is often born out of dissent. One measure of a thriving democracy is the extent to which it fosters vibrant dissent.
Finally, it might also be said that a culture of dissent secures a safe haven for the outsider. When individuals no longer fear censure simply for being different, they can give public voice to their private views. Thereby, dissenters are www.cambridge.org © in this web service Cambridge University Press Whatever the objections to dissent, it is valued for all these reasons and others. But what is it we value? When we speak of dissent, what is it of which we speak? When we converse -in homes, schools, offices, court chambers, legislative arenas, and in public generally -how do we use this word? How is it understood? These and other questions are rarely, if ever, asked.
The word "dissent" is treated as a known. When we use it, we seldom quibble over what we mean or understand it to be. It can be good or bad, safe or dangerous, peaceful or violent, prophetic or blasphemous, laudatory or offensive, legal or illegal. But that "it" is an uncontested constant. "Dissent" does its linguistic work with few decipherable, conceptual traces. In this way, "dissent" is like air -we breathe it without noticing it, and its invisibility belies its importance. Many other examples of writings on fundamental concepts abound.
This is a curious -indeed
Yet, for all that has been said about dissent -in books, articles, judicial opinions, and in the popular culture -it is remarkable that no one has devoted much, if any, attention to explaining what dissent is or what we intend to convey when we invoke it. No one has attempted to sketch its philosophical, linguistic, legal, or cultural meanings or usages. Again, as a concept, dissent is taken for granted, as if we should all recognize it immediately when we see or hear it.
www.cambridge.org © in this web service Cambridge University Press By that measure, a dictionary definition of "dissent" should confirm what we purportedly know. Deriving from the Latin verb dissentire ("to differ in sentiment"), the term is defined as "opposition to a proposal or resolution" or "a difference of opinion," or "a disagreement." In light of the many contexts in which the word "dissent" may be used, the Oxford English Dictionary definition is overinclusive. For example, in familial disputes -a daughter says to her mother, "You're wrong" -there is surely disagreement, but is there necessarily dissent? Or if after watching a performance of Luciano Pavarotti, an opera lover asserted that Pavarotti was the best singer in the world and his friend were to voice a different opinion -"Jose Carreras made a much better Rudolfo" -would we refer to this difference as an instance of dissent? On the one hand, if we examined the matter analytically, the answer to these questions might possibly be "yes." On the other hand, if we thought of the matter linguistically, the answer would probably be "no."
Additionally, the OED definition suffers from underinclusiveness. "Opposition to a proposal or resolution" does not seem either extensive enough or strong enough to encompass various concepts that we might well understand as aspects of dissent, such as "provocation," "defiance," "civil disobedience," "destruction," or "rebellion." Moreover, unless the phrase "proposal or resolution" is read quite broadly, in which case its linguistic purchase is diminished, the definition could not begin to capture more generalized instances of opposition to a societal way of life or a cultural attitude or aesthetic.
xvi

Prologue
The gospel of the dictionary notwithstanding, we might wonder whether we have a real understanding of what dissent is or how we use it. We might wonder if we have an informed sense of what it means or how we speak of it in our modern culture of political pluralism, societal toleration, and corporate exploitation. And, should we pause to think seriously about dissent, we might also wonder whether we have a fully informed idea of how it relates to, and operates in, our system of freedom of expression, be it political, religious, or other.
This philosophical, linguistic, cultural, and jurisprudential problem becomes acute when we ask a simple question: Who qualifies as a dissenter? Some candidates are said to be obvious: Socrates, Jesus, Joan of Arc, Luther, Thoreau, Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Margaret Sanger, or Christopher Hitchins. Other candidates seem far less apparent: John Wilkes Booth, Lee Harvey Oswald, Huey P. Newton, Patty Hearst, "The Unabomber," and the Columbine High School killers. Similarly, what about Zacarias Moussaoui, the 9/11 terrorist, or Jared Loughner, the man charged with the attempted assassination of Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords? Can we label all of these people dissenters? If so, why? If not, why not? The dictionary definition does little to help us resolve such questions.
If some of those names seem anomalous as dissenters, this points to a related question: What qualifies as dissenting activity? To be clear, the issue is not the legality of an activity, but whether it may reasonably be labeled an act of dissent. When violence is added to the conceptual mix, the question becomes more complicated. Just consider a
